The Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978: A Legal and Economic Analysis by Hansen, Scott W.
Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 7 | Issue 1 Article 4
12-15-1979
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act
Amendments of 1978: A Legal and Economic
Analysis
Scott W. Hansen
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Legal History, Theory and
Process Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Scott W. Hansen The Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 7 Pepp. L. Rev. 1
(1980)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol7/iss1/4
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act
Amendments of 1978: A Legal and Economic
Analysis
American workers who are fast approaching the age of sixty-five may
find that recent amendments to the Age Discrimination in Employment of
1967 (ADEA) have greatly reshaped their employment prospects. Examin-
ing these recent amendments from both a demographic and an economic
point of view, the author provides a thorough analysis of the pros and cons
of increasing the coverage of ADEA to persons up to seventy years of age.
Against a backdrop of case law and legislative history, the author scruti-
nizes the amendments to the ADEA in search of the nature of age discrimi-
nation and the amendment's effect, both current and potential, upon the
way of life of the American worker.
In Jonathan Swift's famous satire, Gulliver's Travels, the hero
encounters the Struldbrugs, a tribe of people gifted with long life,
living in the Kingdom of Luggnagg. Gulliver expects to find them
respected for their experience and wisdom, but learns that soci-
ety considers them as nuisances, as if they were cursed. "As soon
as they have completed the term of eighty years, they are looked
on as dead in law ... After that period they are held incapable of
any employment of trust or profit; they cannot purchase lands, or
take leases." The Struldbrugs were forbidden from begging "be-
cause they [were] provided for by the public, although, indeed
with a very scanty allowance."1
Today, 250 years later, the 23 million Americans who reach age
sixty-five receive a treatment not dissimilar to that accorded to
the Struldbrugs. "Held incapable of any employment of trust or
profit," the older Americans have, until recently, been summarily
relieved of employment and responsibility upon reaching age
sixty-five.2
Under the mandatory retirement scheme, members of the work
1. J. SwI-r, THE WORKS OF JOHNATHIAN SwIwr, D.D. 183 (1880) (first published
in Nov., 1726). This story is a terribly true prophecy of Swift's own hapless condi-
tion for some years before his death. Lord Orrey remarks that "the description of
the Struldbrugs is an instructive piece of morality; for if we consider it in a serious
light, it tends to reconcile us to our final dissolution. Death, when set in contrast
to the immortality of the Struldbrugs is no longer the king of terrors; he loses his
sting; he appears to us a friend, and we cheerfully obey his summons, because it
brings certain relief to the greatest miseries." Id. at 184.
2. Drucker, Thinking About Retirement Policy, Wall St. J., Sept. 15, 1977 at 24.
"Compulsory retirement is as good as dead. The only question now is how fast it
force are compelled to retire when they reach a given chronologi-
cal age. Mandatory retirement is but one example of discrimina-
tion based upon age, however, it is not the most common form.3
Recently the demands of society have fostered an impetus to
relieve, with legislation, the imposition thrust upon the elderly4 to
retire at age sixty-five. 5 In March, 1978, a joint House-Senate com-
mittee reached agreement- on a measure to amend the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).6 The
amendment abolished mandatory retirement for most federal em-
ployees 7 and increased, to seventy, the age of individuals pro-
tected by the Act.8 Further, it rescinded the exemption
previously granted to existing pension programs containing provi-
sions that expressly require retirement before age seventy.9 The
last provision is of importance because the majority of mandatory
retirements result from limitations imposed by pension plans.o
will be abolished, and all signs point to its going much faster than anyone would
have thought likely." Id.
3. Statistics compiled by the Labor Department in 1972 indicate 36 percent of
the businesses investigated had violated one or more provisions of the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621-633 (1967). The Act prohibits em-
ployers of 20 or more individuals from discriminating against employees or
prospective employees on account of age. See U.S. Dept. of Labor Employment
Standards Administration, Report on the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967, 6 (1972).
4. The terms "elderly" and "aged" will not be used in this comment to desig-
nate any chronological age, but will refer, in a general way to people 60 years of
age and older. The use of these terms is not intended to be pejorative, but will
serve to recognize that the members of this group are those most severely affected
by age discrimination in employment.
5. There are several bills recently introduced to Congress recognizing the
employment needs of the aged. S. 1784 would gradually extend the age of retire-
ment over a three year period. S. 177 would raise the age to 68 years in 1978, 70
years in 1980, 72 years in 1982, and finally eliminate mandatory retirement com-
pletely in 1985. S. 481 would immediately remove all age restrictions. S. 615 en-
courages seniors (65 and over) to continue working through the offerance of a tax
incentive (a delayed retirement credit of 6 2/3% per year). H.R. 1981 would amend
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to proscribe age discrimination as well as
sex, race and religious discrimination (42 U.S.C. § 2001). H.R. 6861 and 7945 would
eliminate the mandatory retirement imposed on federal employees. The intent of
these bills was largely realized with the passage of H.R. 5383, Pub. L. No. 95-256, 29
U.S.C. § 631, extending the age for mandatory retirement to 70 in the private sector
and entirely eliminating the retirement requirement in the public sector.
6. 29 U.S.C. § 621-634 (1968).
7. Pub. L. No. 95-256, amending 29 U.S.C. § 633.
8. Pub. L. No. 95-256, amending 29 U.S.C. § 631.
9. Id., amending 29 U.S.C. § 623.
10. Accurate determinations of the number of persons in the U.S. subject to
mandatory retirement is difficult. Private pension plans currently cover an esti-
mated 31 million workers, 16 million of whom are subject to some form of
mandatory retirement.
In 1974 private pension coverage was put at 29.8 million. Skolnik, Private Pen-
sion Plans, 1950-1974, Soc. SEc. BuLL. 3-17 (1976). An extrapolation of this figure
over the ensuing four year period would raise the figure to approximately 31 mil-
[Vol. 7: 85, 19791 Age Discrimination
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
The bill, passed by the House and Senate with nearly unani-
mous votes, was signed into law on April 6, 1978, by President
Jimmy Carter."
The law became effective in three steps. First, it rescinded the
exemption granted to pension plans under ADEA,12 voiding the
provisions in private plans that compelled the retirement of em-
ployees before age sixty-five. 13 Second, on September 30, 1978,
mandatory retirement for federal employees was abolished. Fi-
nally, on January 1, 1979, the coverage of the ADEA was extended
to persons up to seventy years of age.14
The new law provides several exemptions: persons subject to
mandatory retirement under the terms of collective bargaining
agreements are not covered by the amended act until the expira-
tion of their existing agreement or until January 1, 1980, which-
ever comes first;15 the amendment did not alter the provision in
the original act that exempted from coverage those occupations
for which age is a bona fide qualification;16 an employer must
have twenty or more employees before he is subject to coverage
lion. In 1974 it was estimated, of those covered by pension plans, 45 percent were
subject to mandatory retirement. Kittner, Forced Retirement: How Common Is
It?, 100 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 60-61 (Dec. 1977). This figure may be contrasted with a
1971 estimation of 58 percent for those under pension plans were subjected to
mandatory retirement. Davis, Pension Provisions Affecting the Employment of
Older Workers, 96 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 41-45 (1973). A more reasonable estimation
of 52 percent would account for, yet not fully recognize, the extent of the exagger-
ated decline mentioned in the Kittner study. 52 percent of the 31 million workers
subject to a pension plan would indicate that 16 million persons in private pension
plans are subject to mandatory retirement.
Federal Civil Service and other government pension programs extended like
provisions to another 13 million, inasmuch as nearly all federal employees were
subject to mandatory retirement prior to the passage of H.R. 5383. In addition, ap-
proximately 79 percent of state and municipal pension programs include such pro-
visions. W. GREENOUGH & F. KING, PENSION PLANS AND PUBLIC POLICY 127 (1976).
Thus, there were 16 million persons in the private sector and 13 million persons
in the public sector subject to rules mandating compulsory retirement at the time
5383 was passed.
11. Age Discrimination in Employment Amendment of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256
(approved April 6, 1978).
12. This provision excepts pension provisions in collective bargaining agree-
ments that had been entered into as of September 1, 1977. All such provisions will
fall under the Act, as amended, upon termination of the agreement or by January
1, 1980. Id., amending 29 U.S.C. § 623.
13. Id., amending 29 U.S.C. § 623.
14. Id., amending 29 U.S.C. § 631.
15. See note 11, supra.
16. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1). E.g., police work (see Massachusetts Board of Retire-
ment v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976)), or other jobs entailing unusual risk.
under the Act;'7 and, in addition, a "bona fide executive" or per-
son in a "high policy making position" may still be required to re-
tire at age sixty-five if he or she will receive $27,000 or more in
employer-financed retirement income. 18 Similarly, a college or
university may retire a tenured professor at sixty-five until July 1,
1982.19 And, of course, the new law will not prevent an employer
from dismissing an older worker for good cause other than age.
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Generally, there is no history of prejudice or discrimination
based on dislike or intolerance for the older worker.20 Instead,
age discrimination was initially founded on erroneous assump-
tions adopted by businesses concerned about the effects of age on
ability.21 Unlike other forms of discrimination in employment
based on race, creed, or bigotry, which result from feelings about
a person unrelated to his ability to do a job, discrimination
against the older worker arises because of assumptions made
about the effects of age on performance. 22
The inception of formal age discrimination came with
mandatory retirement, initiated in 1889 by Germany's Iron Chan-
cellor, Otto Von Bismarck. The seventy-nine year old chancellor's
determination that sixty-five was to be the age of mandated re-
tirement reflected the prevailing attitude of the period.23 He
could not have foreseen that his action would decide, for the first
time, when "old age" would begin. 24
The United States independently settled on the same retire-
ment age for separate social, economic, and political reasons.25 In
17. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1968).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 633(c) (1968).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 633(d) (1968).
20. U.S. Dept. of Labor Report to the Congress on Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment under Section 715 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 15 n.6, (1965) [hereinaf-
ter Secretary's Report].
21. U.S. Dept. of Labor, Report to the Congress on Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment under Section 715 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Research Materials 67-
69, 10-15, n.1 (1965) [hereinafter referred to as Research Materials).
22. 113 CONG. REC. 34742 (1967) (Rep. Burke); 113 CONG. REC. 34752 (1967)
(Rep. Dwyer); 113 CONG. REc. 31254 (1967) (Sen. Javits).
23. Controversy over Mandatory Retirement Age: Should Congress Prohibit, 56
CONG. DIG. 258-88 (1977). The Chancellor adopted the policy in a political maneu-
ver designed to thwart an impetus toward socialism. At the time the average life
expectancy was from 40-45 years. Chancellor Bismarck initiated the policy with
the understanding that very few individuals would be able to collect on this social
insurance program. 113 CONG. REC. 31256 (1976).
24. Retiring at 65: An Arbitrary Cut-Off That Started With Three Men, 110
DuN's REv. 31-32 (Oct. 1977).
25. Id.
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1935 the Social Security Act26 was passed without much consider-
ation as to the eligibility age for benefits.27 It was with the pas-
sage of this Act that sixty-five became uniformly institutionalized
as the beginning of "old age." Private pension plans generally ac-
cepted this as the age at which a beneficiary would be eligible for
benefits. Pension plans, both public and private, have, over the
years, come to provide the primary incentive to retire.28
Mandatory retirement has developed recently as a political is-
sue. Initially, the passage of the Social Security Act provided a
tool with which management could gracefully release the older
worker whose output had declined.29 Unions also supported the
concept because few of their blue collar workers wished to work
past sixty-five. This allowed younger workers to find jobs, thus
easing unemployment.3 0 As the concept became increasingly ac-
cepted, the benefits of private pension plans were enlarged and
made available to retirees at earlier ages.
During this period of time, man's average life expectancy in-
creased significantly. Accordingly, there has been a marked in-
crease in the proportion of a worker's life spent in retirement. 31 It
is interesting to note that if the retirement age had increased with
26. 42 U.S.C. § 301 et. seq. (1970 and Supp. Vol. 1975).
27. Robert J. Meyers, author of the bill, indicated that he wanted to set at 70,
the age at which benefits would begin to accrue. However, age 65 was determined
to be more potentially expedient in an effort to satisfy the Townsendities (follow-
ers of Francis Townsend, an eccentric California physician advocating that $200 be
given monthly to each person over the age of 60. The selection of age 65 was con-
sistent with the existing corporate pension plans of several large corporations, in-
cluding Standard Oil, Kodak, and General Electric. Retiring at 65: An Arbitrary
Cut-Off That Started With Three Men, 110 DuN's REV. 31-32 (Oct. 1977).
28. Skolnik, Private Pension Plans, 1950-74, 39 Soc. SEC. BULL. 3-17 (1976).
61 percent of workers with pension plans were subject to mandatory retirement.
80 percent of those with mandatory retirement came under a pension plan. Reno,
Compulsory Retirement Among Newly Entitled Workers: Survey of New Benefi-
ciaries, 35 Soc. SEC. BULL. 4 (1972).
29. Big Fight Over Retirement at Age 65, 83 U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP. 30-32,
Oct. 3, 1977.
30. Id.
31. In 1900 the average life expectancy for men was 46 years while women
lived an average of 48 years. In 1940 these figures had increased to 60 years and 65
years, respectively. Ten years later men were averaging 65 years and women, 71
years. In 1975, the average male lived for 68 years while, at the same time, women
average a lifespan of 76 years. Since the inception of Social Security, the average
American male's lifetime has increased by 10 years, the woman's has increased 13
years. Retiring at 65: An Arbitrary Cut-Off That Started With Three Men, 110
DUN'S REV. 31-32 (Oct. 1977).
longer life expectancies, today's equivalent retirement age would
be between seventy-five and eighty years.
Responding to the impact of the increasing average age of em-
ployees 32 and the recognition of the problem of age discrimination
and mandatory retirement, Congress enacted several provisions
between the early 1960's and the recent amendment to the ADEA.
In 1964, the Civil Rights Act 33 was passed. This act did not pro-
scribe employment discrimination34 based on age, but directed
the Secretary of Labor to make a study assessing the magnitude
and effect, if any, of age discrimination. 35 The Secretary's study,
presented in 1965, declared there was "no evidence of prejudice
based on a dislike or intolerance for the older worker."36 Instead,
age discrimination was found to be generally based on assump-
tions and adopted by businesses concerned with efficiency and
the effects of age on ability.37 A general correlation was found be-
tween the incidence of race discrimination and other factors such
as past discrimination, cultural deprivation, history, or the like. 38
Additional factors were found, but dismissed, as prejudices unre-
lated to the ability to perform a particular task.39 For example, an
employer hostile toward blacks cannot legally refuse employment
to a Negro exclusively on the basis that he is black. Age discrimi-
nation was found to be different because it is initially related to
ability;40 a fact which was specifically noted in the ADEA41 and
32. The numbers of employees covered under the ADEA has increased as the
size of the age group increased. In 1974, 948,113 (40.0 percent) of federal employ-
ees were under 40 years of age; 1,392,787 (58.8 percent) of federal employees were
between the ages of 40-64, while 29,087 (1.2 percent) were over age 65. 1974 Decem-
ber Central Personnel File, listing all federal employees. Of nearly 86 million em-
ployees in non-government related jobs, 47,493,000 (55.3 percent) were 40 years old
or younger; 35,622,000 (41.4 percent) were between the ages of 40 and 65; and
2,821,000 (3.3 percent) were over age 65. Bureau of Labor Statistics, January 1975,
listing all civilians in the U.S. labor force, age 16 and over. This represents a total
of 91 million employees, 51,394,000 (56.5 percent) of whom were under age 40;
36,696,000 (40.3 percent) of whom were aged 40 to 65; and 2,921,000 (3.2 percent) of
whom were over the age of 65.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-et seq. (1964).
34. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2000h-6 (1964, 1970
and 1974) proscribes employment discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion,
or national origin but specifically excluded age as a protected classification.
35. Section 715 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-14, mandating a
study, by the Secretary of Labor, of concerns relative to age discrimination.
36. Secretary's Report, note 15, at 6, supra.
37. Research Materials, note 21 at 10-20, supra.
38. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHi. LAw REV. 235, 257-63
(1971).
39. Id. at 238-39.
40. Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 90 HARV. L. REV.
380, 384 (1976). 1
41. 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1970) covering age discrimination in employment only for
ages 40 to 65; and 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1970) providing an exception where age is a bona
fide occupational qualification.
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the legislative history pertinent to the field of law. 42 Where age
discrimination was found, it was less likely to have been based on
feelings of general hostility than it was to have been founded on
ill-conceived, inaccurate, and often erroneous assumptions about
the effect of older age on abilities and productivity.43 The Secre-
tary's Report concluded by generally recommending legislation to
eliminate age discrimination. 44
A. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
In 1967, President Johnson publicly called for the elimination of
age discrimination in employment.4 5 His proposal became the
ADEA in 1968.46 The Act expressly provided for the elimination
of age discrimination against workers between the ages of forty-
five and sixty-five, 47 and specifically exempted from coverage em-
ployees over sixty-five.
Initially, the ADEA was viewed as a mere expansion or exten-
sion of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.48 In fact, the ADEA was
established independently of the Civil Rights Act and incorpo-
rated the enforcement provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act.49 One of the reasons for choosing to implement a separate
anti-age discrimination measure instead of amending Title VII,
was to ease the work load placed on the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (EEOC), which had been created to ad-
42. H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, n.1 (1967) (message of Pres.
Johnson); and S. REP. No. 723, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1967) (Sen. Javits).
43. See Constitutional Attacks on Mandatory Retirement: A Reconsideration,
23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 549, 555-56 (1976); Protective Services for the Elderly. The Limits
of Parens Patriae, 40 Mo. L. REV. 215, n.2 (1975).
44. See note 36, supra.
45. The Background of Present Age Retirement Practices, 56 CONG. DIG. 258-88
(Nov. 1977).
46. 29 U.S.C. § 621-633 (1968).
47. Section 12 of the ADEA specifically stated the Act's provisions "shall be
limited to individuals who are at least forty years of age, but less than sixty-five
years of age." 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1970). This provision was expanded in the 1978
amendments to include those less than 70 years of age. See note 5, supra.
48. Age Discrimination in Employment: Hearings on Age Discrimination Bills
before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare. 90th Cong. 1st Sess. 22 (1967) [hereinafter 1967 Senate Hearings]. In
fact, as late as 1974, there were two bills pending to amend the Civil Rights Act to
include age as a protected classification. H.R. 16972, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) and
120 CONG. REc. H. 10598 (Oct. 15, 1974). Both bills died in the House Education
and Labor Committee.
49. 29 U.S.C. § 211(b), 216(b) & (c), 217, 626(b), (1970).
ministrate the complaints arising from the Civil Rights Act.5o
The enforcement of the provisions of the two acts has varied to
some degree. Title VII has been strictly construed to provide the
greatest degree of protection for groups falling within its provi-
sions. 51 The ADEA has been applied with a lesser and more va-
ried range of protection. In some actions, the results reached
were consistent with the outcome of most Title VII cases.52 In
other situations, however, the courts found that the existence of a
separate statute acted as their signal that a dissimilar degree of
protection was to be applied.53
The scope and magnitude of the ADEA are enormous. Over 64
million persons are employed by more than one million employ-
ers subject to the provisions embodied in the ADEA.54 Labor
force data indicates that 37 million employed persons were in the
forty to sixty-five year age group in 1975.55 The impact of the Act
has the potential to affect virtually every worker in the labor
force.
The original Act provided for three primary exceptions. First,
the Act was designed to apply only to employers of twenty or
more persons.5 6 Second, jobs with a certain age requirement as a
bona fide occupational qualification were also exempted from cov-
erage.57 Finally, the ADEA also approved exceptions for pension
50. Congress apparently felt that a more adequate administration of com-
plaints arising out of the ADEA could be achieved by allowing the Wage and Hour
Division of the Department of Labor to handle the actions. The Wage and Hour
Division was created under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Age Discrimination in
Employment: Hearings on Age Discrimination Bills Before the General Subcom-
mittee on Labor of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 7 (1967).
51. See Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1969); Hill, The
New Judicial Perception of Employment Discrimination-Litigation under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 43 U. COLO. L. REV. 243, 253-54 & n.40 (1972);
Note, Employment Discrimination: A Title VII Symposium, 34 LA. L. REV. 540
(1974).
52. Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1122 (1975); Hodgson v. First Federal Savings & Loan Assn., 455 F.2d 818,
822 (5th Cir. 1972); Aaron v. Davis, 414 F. Supp. 453 (E.D. Ark. 1976).
53. Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 312 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 422
U.S. 1045 (1976). See also, Massachusetts v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976), an action
instituted prior to the passage of the ADEA. In Murgia, the Court found that the
standard requiring strict scrutiny (the Title VII standard) could not be applied in
age discrimination cases inasmuch as age was not a suspect classification and em-
ployment was not a fundamental interest.
54. Employment Standards Administration, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, AGE Dis-
CRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1967: A REPORT COVERING ACTIVITIES UNDER
THE ACT DURING 1974, at 17 (1975).
55. Id.
56. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1967).
57. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1967).
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and retirement plans mandating early retirement.58 Again, an
employer was not enjoined from differentiating between employ-
ees on factors other than those incident to age.
The courts were encouraged to construe the ADEA liberally to
achieve the provision's primary remedial purposes; to protect the
older worker from discrimination 59 and to promote the employ-
ment of older persons "based on their ability rather than age." 60
In practice, however, the courts took a more narrow view of the
provision.61 The Supreme Court initially refused to apply the
more stringent level of protection given to similar cases arising
under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.62 It indicated that given a clear
opportunity, it would refuse to expand the categories of funda-
mental interest or suspect classifications in order to provide sanc-
tions against age discrimination. 63 The favorable treatment of
provisions requiring mandatory retirement dashed the hopes of
those wishing that the Supreme Court would either strike down
or narrowly construe such provisions.64 It became clear that the
impetus to eliminate mandatory retirement provisions would
have to come through legislative, rather than judicial action.
Responding to the need for further legislative regulation, the
Age Discrimination Act in 1975 was enacted to prevent discrimi-
58. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (2) (1967).
59. Nabors v. United States, 568 F.2d 657, 659 (9th Cir. 1978); Dartt v. Shell Oil
Co., 539 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1976), affd per curiam, 434 U.S. 99 (1977), rehearing
denied, 434 U.S. 1042 (1976); Moses v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 525 F.2d 92, 93 (8th
Cir. 1975); Curry v. Continental Airlines, 513 F.2d 691, 693 (9th Cir. 1975).
60. 29 U.S.C. § 621(a) (2) & 621(b) (1970).
61. See United Airlines v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977). This first Supreme
Court test of the ADEA, holds the bona fide occupational requirement exception
should be given a narrow construction resulting in a greater degree of protection.
See also Moses v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 550 F.2d 1113, 1114 (8th Cir. 1977); Mar-
shall v. Hills Bros., 432 F. Supp. 1320, 1325 (N.D. Calif. 1977); Fellows v. Medford
Corp., 431 F. Supp. 199, 201 (D. Ore. 1977).
62. Note the similarity of the bona fide occupational requirements in 29 U.S.C.
§ 623(f) (1) (1970) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1970). The application of the require-
ment under the ADEA has been less narrowly construed than like actions under
§ 703(e) of Title VII. See also Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1225
(9th Cir. 1969), Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co., 408 F.2d 228,
235 (5th Cir. 1969).
63. See generally, Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307
(1976). See also Barrett, Judicial Supervision of Legislative Classifications-A
More Modest Role for Equal Protection?, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 89 (1976); Gunther,
Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1972). See also note 139, infra.
64. See Note, 4 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 369, 373 (1977).
nation in federally-funded programs or activities. 65 By that year,
forty-three states had anti-age discrimination laws. Of those, the
regulations in six states applied only to public sector employ-
ment. Fifteen states had no upper age limits specified, while the
remainder prohibited discrimination up to, but not past ages vary-
ing from fifty to sixty-five years.66 Thus, the state and federal lim-
itations on discrimination were directed toward the middle-aged,
and failed to provide any relief to those above sixty-five years of
age.
The passage of H.R. 5383, amending the ADEA, marks a re-
sponse to this omission. In recognition of the demands main-
tained over the ten year period since the passage of the ADEA,
Congress amended the Act to provide the first measure of protec-
tion to older America.
B. Demographical Factors
An impetus to the enactment of the ADEA amendment was the
consideration given to several conflicting demographical factors.
The numbers of older workers in the labor force has been steadily
increasing. This is primarily due to two factors: Americans are
living longer 67 and, since the mid-1950's, there has been a gradual
decline in the birth rate.68 The net effect is that the average age
of all American citizens is getting progressively older 69 and there
is a higher ratio of retirees to workers. 70
During this same period of time there has been a marked ten-
dency for Americans to retire at an earlier age.7 1 In 1974, seventy-
65. 42 U.S.C. § 6101-6107 (1975).
66. Controversy over Mandatory Retirement Age: Should Congress Prohibit?,
56 CONG. DIG. 258-88 (Nov. 1977).
67. See note 31, supra. The life expectancy in 1900 was 47 years, 54 years in
1920, 60 years in 1930, and 71 years in 1974.
68. The current birthrate is at 1.75 births per female. The figure reached 3.7
births in the 1950's during the baby boom. 2.1 is the birthrate needed to maintain a
constant population growth. Retirement at 70?, 118 FORBES 62 (Nov. 11, 1976).
69. Id. In 1977, 18 out of every 100 people were aged 65 or older. In 2025, this
figure will increase to 32 out of every 100 people. In 1930, 5.4 percent of the popula-
tion was over age 65, 8.1 percent in 1950, 9.9 percent in 1970 and 11.1 percent in
1975. In addition, those reaching age 65 are living much longer. The average life
expectancy of a 65 year old man is 13.2 years. 65 year old women will continue to
live an average of 17.5 additional years. This period of time is one in which the
individual is largely prevented from working.
70. Id. In 1977, there were 31 retirees to every 100 workers. By 2025, the ratio
will be 2 active workers to each retired worker. This factor alone will account for a
40 percent increase in the cost of Social Security, discounting inflation. At current
levels, the average worker, in 2025, will pay 31 percent of his income to retirement
(15 percent to Social Security), disability, and Medicare. The average worker paid
13 percent of his income into these funds in 1977.
71. Retiring at 65: It Started with Three Men, 110 DUN's REV. 31-2 (Oct. 1977);
Colamosca, Grey Rights Retirement Fight, 110 DUN's REV. (Oct. 1977).
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two percent of all new Social Security recipients were early retir-
ees 72 receiving reduced benefits.7 3 The trend in the private sector
is equally dramatic. For example, only 164 of the 7980 retirements
at General Motors were at the firm's mandatory retirement age.7 4
Despite this trend, from five to twenty percent of those persons
age sixty-four or older who are currently working still indicate
they would continue to work.75
The trend toward early retirement has fostered some adverse
effects. It creates an undue strain on the various pension sys-
tems. The General Motors study, cited above, indicates the ratio
of workers to pensioners has dropped dramatically and further
drops are contemplated.76 Similarly, the number of those supple-
menting the Social Security Trust Fund has diminished in rela-
tion to the numbers to whom payment is being made. To support
the system, it may be necessary to increase the amount of the
contribution from those in the labor market.77
C. The Application of Mandatory Retirement
There is no uniform application of the concept of mandatory re-
tirement. Although the majority of forced retirements do occur at
age sixty-five, many retirements are compelled at both younger
and older ages. Of those plans requiring earlier retirement, sixty-
two is the most common age.78 Most federal employees face
72. Of the early retirees, 67.3 percent were male and 78.9 percent of this group
were female. Age 62 was the most common age for early retirement. The rate of
early retirements has been growing by two to three percent yearly. Background of
Present Retirement Age Practices, 5 CONG. DIG. 258-88 (Nov. 11, 1977). The overall
retirement age patterns for those aged 65 and over show a decline over 15 percent
in almost every western nation. Labor Force Estimates and Projections, 1950-2000,
INT'L. LAo1 OFFICE, Geneva, (1977).
73. In 1952, reduced benefits became available to women retiring early. Male
early retirees were, similarly given the opportunity to receive actuarily reduced
benefits in 1962.
74. General Motors requires that its employees retire at age 68. See note 71,
supra. See also note 75, infra.
75. Wysocki and Hyatt, Mandatory Retirement at Age 65 is Likely to End:
Business and Labor Wary, 190 Wall St. J. (Oct. 13, 1977).
76. In 1967, there were ten workers for every pensioner. The ratio had
dropped down to 4 to 1 in 1977 and by 1990 there will be two workers contributing
to the pension system for every retiree drawing on it. DuN's REV., see note 71,
supra.
77. Drucker, Thinking About Retirement Policy, 190 Wall St. J. 24 (Sept. 15,
1977). See page 16, infra.
78. J. Prakken, Mandatory Retirement: Issues and Impacts, 3 FED. REs. BANK
OF N.Y.Q. REV. 25, 26 (Spring 1978). Mandatory retirement at age 62 is not in dero-
mandatory retirement at age seventy.7 9
The retirement provisions found in private pension plans result
in the vast majority of forced retirements.80 Almost all plans des-
ignate an age of retirement, at which the rights to the pension are
said to vest. Most plans will not, however, force the employee to
retire at that age. At the election of the employer, some employ-
ees may continue to work until they reach the age of compulsory
retirement.81 In addition, many employers will seek to offer an in-
centive for early retirement by offering benefits that are only
slightly reduced from the amounts given those retiring at age
sixty-five. 82
In 1973, a Bureau of Labor survey covering 63.4 million Ameri-
can employees disclosed that 31.1 million (49 percent) were cov-
ered by a plan or policy that had some type of compulsory
retirement based upon an age limitation.83 Roughly 20 percent of
the plans had provisions for forced early retirement. 84 About 61
percent of the workers with pension plans were subject to
mandatory retirement. Conversely, 80 percent of those subject to
mandatory retirement were covered by some pension plan.8 5 The
provisions for mandatory retirement fell into two different group-
ings.86 Compulsory retirement, most commonly found, does not
force an employer to relinquish the discretion to release or retain
the employee at retirement age. Automatic retirement allows no
such discretion. Further, mandatory retirement is less commonly
found in union bargaining agreements 87 but is more frequently
used by manufacturing agreements. 88
D. Public Response to Mandatory Retirement
In light of the divergent criteria, there was no clear message
upon which Congress could act. Numerous surveys have at-
gation of the ADEA if it is part of a qualified benefit, pension, or retirement pro-
gram.
79. 29 U.S.C. § 633(a) (1967).
80. See note 78, supra.
81. Id.
82. Scope of Mandatory Retirement in the U.S. Today, 56 CONG. DIG. 258-88
(Nov. 1977).
83. Background of Present Age Retirement Practices, 5 CONG. DIG. 258-88 (Nov.
11, 1977).
84. Kittner, Forced Retirement: How Common Is It?, 100 MONTHLY LAB. REV.
60, 61 (Dec. 1977).
85. Reno, Compulsory Retirement Among Newly Entitled Workers, 35 Soc.
SEC. BuLL. 4 (March 1974).
86. Id.
87. A retirement clause is found in 60 percent of the sampled non-negotiated
agreements and 40 percent of the negotiated plans. Id.
88. Mandatory retirement provisions are found in 40 percent of the manufac-
turing contracts and only 30 percent of the non-manufacturing contracts. Id.
[Vol. 7: 85, 19791 Age Discrimination
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
tempted to measure the worker response to mandatory retire-
ment provisions. A recent study indicates that 65 percent of those
surveyed favor abolition of mandatory retirement, but 49 percent
favored early retirement. 9 The same study showed 58 percent of
the people surveyed felt that senior management personnel
should be forced to retire, while 68 percent acknowledged that the
exercise of that concept would deprive society of the benefit of
the knowledge and experience of the older worker.
In another poll, a majority of workers indicated they had not
wanted to retire at the time they were compelled to do so.
Whereas 52 percent of those polled gave mandatory retirement as
the reason why they retired at age sixty-five,90 of that group, 56
percent had indicated they had not wanted to retire at that time.91
Another study indicated that four million people over age sixty-
five who were unemployed or "retired," indicated they would re-
turn to work if given the opportunity.9 2
Thus, the particular juxtaposition of the social demands for re-
medial legislation gave rise to H.R. 5383, amending the ADEA.
Those demands and their impact are discussed below.
II. THE INTERESTS IN OPPOSITION TO THE BILL
A. Productivity as Affected by Age
There is a general presumption that the frailty of the physical
and mental health of elderly individuals is not conducive to con-
tinued employment. Testimony before the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives indicated it was "likely that productivity would suffer"
if the amendments to the ADEA were enacted. 93 A similar pre-
sumption is made by a large segment of American society. There
is, however, no conclusive data to either support or dispute this
contention. A study by Industrial Gerontology indicated factory
work productivity generally decreased after age sixty-five. The
same study noted that there was a slight decline in the productiv-
89. Lederer, Will Congress Put Mandatory Retirement Out to Pasture?, 38
ADMIN. MGT. 28-33, (Sept. 1977).
90. Reno, Why Men Stop Working At or Before Age 65: Findings from a Survey
of New Beneficiaries, 34 Soc. SEC. BuLL. 10 (June 1971).
91. Id.
92. Hearings before the House Subcommittee on Equal Opportunity, State-
ment of Jack Ossofsky, Exec. Dir. of the National Council on Aging (Sept. 14,
1976).
93.. Testimony before the House Select Committee on Aging, 95th Cong., State-
ment of George Skoglund, Bank of America Vice President (Feb. 14, 1977).
ity of postal workers. But the University of Illinois reported, in a
study of 300 employees, that workers over age sixty-five were as
good or better than younger workers.94 The compilations of these
studies on the capabilities of older workers are generally indica-
tive of the results of other similar studies.
The courts have generally held that "age has an inevitable and
definite relationship with the ability to perform work."9 5 The
courts have stopped short of contending that older citizens are
handicapped by a diminished capacity to work productively.
Some courts have, however, recognized declining capabilities ne-
cessitate or justify a cutoff age for employment.96
The American Medical Association has stated the older citizen
is capable and competent to perform meaningful work beyond the
age of sixty-five, 97 but recognizes that there is a generally de-
creasing capability attendant with age.98 Thus, there is no firm in-
dicator of an age of incapability,99 causing most opponents of
mandatory retirement to favor some form of physical assessment
of the worker's capability prior to forcing him to retire.
B. Business Economics and Administration of Mandatory
Retirement
The proponents of mandatory retirement point out that the
medical profession is not able to make accurate individual assess-
ments of physical and psychological competency as required in
the alternative to mandatory retirement. Generally, the medical
profession is able to categorize workers into three groups. The
first group is comprised of those workers that can, without doubt,
continue to work. The second group includes those workers defi-
nitely unable to work. The final group contains those persons
who have a diminished capacity to work effectively. The problem
94. Retiring at 65: It Started With Three Men, 110 DUN'S REV. 31-2 (Oct. 1977).
95. Armstrong v. Howell, 371 F. Supp. 48, 51 (D. Neb. 1974).
96. Townsend v. City and County of Los Angeles, 49 Cal. App. 3d 263, 122 Cal.
Rptr. 500 (1975). "While many persons over 65 years of age are capable of perform-
ing in accordance with standards required by industry, many are not and almost
all persons over 85 are not. If a cutoff date was not specified, a burden of proving
that a 68 year old employee was not satisfactorily fulfilling the requirements of his
job ... would fal on the employer."
97. Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, (1976). Brief
Amici of the American Medical Association; BriefAmici of the Older and Middle
Age Worker Ombudsman Pilot Project of United Communities of Southeastern
Philadelphia and of the Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia.
98. Id.
99. Id. The AMA brief asserted that two criteria should be used to determine
the age of retirement for each worker individually. Those criteria are whether the
worker desires to continue working and whether his or her physical capabilities
should allow him or her to continue working.
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facing medical science is to develop the criteria to definitively de-
termine whether an individual in the third group can or cannot
continue to work. The difficulty involved in making an accurate
assessment is complicated by the reluctance of those in a deci-
sionmaking position to make a determination that would deny a
person his right to his livelihood.
Such determinations would involve a substantial cost of admin-
istration, in addition to the costs already incurred by maintaining
the wages of an employee who has suffered a decline in produc-
tivity. 0 0 Further, the employer is faced with the prospect of in-
curring legal costs to defend his actions against disappointed
employees. 101 A move to avoid all of these difficulties by permit-
ting the continued employment of. workers whose productivity
had fallen would also prove to be costly. 0 2
By administering mandatory retirement, the employer must
pay the consequences of losing capable trained employees as well
as contributing to the pensions of retiring workers.103 Nonethe-
less, mandatory retirement may be one of the most cost efficient
methods of dealing with retirement. Not only is it possible for the
employer to replace aging workers without humiliating them; he
may also avoid the onus of dealing with the particulars of each in-
dividual retirement. Mandatory retirement, when combined with
pension plans and Social Security, may provide the most econom-
ical and efficient method for promoting younger workers while
providing for the orderly and dignified retirement of older work-
ers.
Corporations faced with the prospect of having to decide which
employees to retain and which employees to retire would have to
100. The steel industry now has such a plan that applies only to blue collar
workers. This policy requires each worker to pass a yearly physical examination.
If he passes, he is allowed to keep his job. The Ax for Forced Retirement, Bus.
WEEK 38-39 (Sept. 19, 1977).
101. In reality, if an employer reduced the wages of aging workers whose pro-
ductivity had fallen, he would undoubtedly damage the morale of his employees
and risk criticism from the public for his treatment of the elderly. The alternative
to reducing wages is to better utilize the employee's deteriorating skills by as-
signing him to a less demanding position or to fire him. Prakken, Mandatory Re-
tirement: Issues and Impacts, FED. RES. BOARD OF N.Y.Q. REV. 25, 27 (Spring
1978).
102. Id. Raising the age of mandatory retirement to seventy greatly increases
the costs of employing until retirement those workers whose capabilities are wan-
ing. Many older workers would have to be dismissed unless employers adopt a
policy of retaining workers who have a diminished productivity.
103. Id.
make tough decisions about who is still able to do their job. A
continuing policy of mandatory retirement would "eliminate une-
qual treatment stemming from individual judgments as to who
should and should not continue to work after a certain age. '104
Such judgments about performance become almost as difficult to
make as those regarding physical capabilities.10 5
If an individual refused to retire, then the company would have
to make the judgment he was no longer able to work effectively.
"The disputes and problems created between the employer and
employee would cause more grievance and concern" and would
be more disruptive than a uniform policy for all. 106
Management has resisted efforts to do away with mandatory re-
tirement entirely, but seems to feel the only adverse effect of the
new amendment to the ADEA is that it will increase costs by
maintaining a payroll of individuals characterized by a declining
productivity.
A policy of mandatory retirement is beneficial inasmuch as it al-
lows both management and the employee to plan ahead and make
decisions for the future. Management can accurately calculate
the projected number of vacancies during a year and plan accord-
ingly. Similarly, employees can more accurately plan emotion-
ally, psychologically, and financially for their future if they expect
retirement at a specified age.' 07
The new law will force some firms to adopt a new retirement
policy. Firms have often allowed employees to work two or three
years in declining productivity rather than firing them, knowing
they would retire upon reaching age sixty-five. In this sense,
mandatory retirement serves as a painless method to weed out
employees who have lost their effectiveness. Knowing the proc-
ess may take an additional five years, some companies may be
forced to deal with the problem earlier by firing the inefficient em-
ployee, rather than letting age take its course.
Mandatory retirement programs serve to remind employers and
employees of the inevitability of retirement and of the need to
plan and save for it. It also provides a means for management to
forecast labor needs and costs and offers a rational way to whittle
down high levels of unemployment.
104. House Select Committee on Aging, 95th Cong., Testimony of G.F. Jankow-
ski, V.P. Administration, CBS, Inc. (Feb. 10, 1977).
105. Forced Retirement: An Issue That's Riling Older Americans, 83 U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP. 75-76 (July 4,1977).
106. Id. Reporting a statement of H.J. Lartigue, Jr., Exxon's manager of em-
ployee relations before a House committee.
107. Senate Subcommittee on Labor of the Human Resources Committee,
Statement of AT&T Co., and the Bell System Associated Companies (1977).
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The employee is also given the opportunity to plan ahead. The
knowledge that one is to retire on a certain date in the future al-
lows the individual to plan his activities and finances more accu-
rately. He or she would be less likely to be caught in financial
straits because a sudden illness struck between the ages of sixty-
five and seventy.
Objectors to the new law contend the less effective worker is
usually the type that would choose to work past age sixty-five.
They argue that if the employee had failed to be aggressive on the
job and had not been promoted, he probably had not been aggres-
sive in managing his money either. He will probably have few as-
sets and will want to augment his retirement income.
Management can, however, restructure careers to conform to
the needs of management and the capabilities of the employee.
This gradual withdrawal from the labor force by older employees
makes possible the luring and promotion of other workers. A
postponed retirement would be more graceful for the older em-
ployees and would not seriously aggravate unemployment among
the young.
The speed with which the new law was passed seems to have
caught management by surprise. 08 The current feeling is the pro-
vision was "steamrollered" through Congress and management
had little time to assess its impact. 09 Some management experts
claim the country's economy will be endangered and that "the
long term price of the legislation will be a slower growth in real
income for Americans." 110 They also predict older workers will be
less productive than young ones, and this will contribute to the
deterioration of America's competitive position in the world's
economy.
The concept of mandatory retirement saves face for the em-
ployee who would otherwise be forced out of work. Workers
under mandatory retirement programs are retired with dignity,
rather than being fired or compelled to accept a lower paying job.
Protracted disputes over a worker's capability are avoided, as are
extended court or administrative battles over the abilities of a dis-
108. The Axfor Forced Retirement, Bus. WEEK 38-39 (Sept. 19, 1977). Statement
of John Post, executive director of the Business Roundtable.
109. Id.
110. New Retirement Rules. Their Impact on Business Workers, 83 U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. 71-73 (Nov. 7, 1977).
charged employee."'
C. Impact on Maintenance and Income Programs
The cost of maintaining an older work force is likely to increase
with the new provision. Although this expense is difficult to esti-
mate, Social Security pensions and life and health insurance
plans will probably cost more with a larger work force of older
employees. 112 Pension costs will presumably decline initially, but
medical insurance costs would be increased."13 The savings in
pension costs would probably be offset by an increase in benefit
costs.114 Thus, much of the opposition to the measure was based
on the devastating impact on the actuarial based pension plans
and other employee benefit programs. 115
In testimony before the House of Representatives, it was indi-
cated the measure would shift the tax burden from Social Secur-
ity to unemployment or other social welfare programs.116 The
government presently bears the financial burden of compulsory
retirement. Currently, the agency's funds are not keeping up with
the increase in the numbers of retired workers. The fight to keep
Social Security payments in line with inflation has, already, fos-
tered a deficit. In addition, the taxable wage rate is being ad-
justed upward annually. That means although presently retired
persons' benefits go up with the cost of living, workers still in the
labor force will not only get the cost of living hikes once they re-
tire, but also the advantages of the higher wage base on which
they will be paying taxes by that time. In some cases, the benefits
will be higher than the level of the pensioner's salary.17
111. Prakken, Mandatory Retirement: Issues and Impacts, 3 FED. RES. BANK OF
N.Y.Q. REV. 25, 26 (Spring 1978).
112. Retiring at 65. An Arbitrary Cut-Off That Started With Three Men, 110
DuN's REV. 31-32 (Oct. 1977).
113. Corporations are currently spending 133 million to support 35 million pen-
sioners. This represents an increase of 300 percent over the last ten years. There
are currently 23 million Americans aged 65 or older (11 percent of the population).
Within 30 years this figure will rise to 51 million (17 percent of the populace). The
growing number of elderly has, accordingly, seriously taxed the nation's pension
systems. Ten years ago General Motors had a ratio of ten workers for every pen-
sioner. It now has one pensioner supported by four workers, a figure which should
be halved by 1990. Retiring at 65: An Arbitrary Cut-Off That Started With Three
Men, 110 DuN's REV. 31-32 (Oct. 1977).
114. Wallace, How Retire-at-70 Would Effect Banks, 69 BANKING 16 (Nov. 1977).
Pensions are determined on the salary level for the five years preceding retire-
ment. On the assumption that the last five years of employment would be at an
average higher scale of pay, the level of benefits would also be higher.
115. Controversy over Mandatory Retirement Age: Should Congress Prohibit?,
56 CONG. DIG. 258-88 (Nov. 1977).
116. House Subcommittee on Aging, supra note 93.
117. In addition, there will be fewer taxpayers paying into the system that sup-
ports the retired generation. As the ratio of workers to beneficiaries rises, those
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Currently, there are 22 million Americans age sixty-five and
over, who are poorly cared for by Social Security and pension
benefits. Ninety percent of the aged rely on these benefits as
their primary income. As such, an analysis of the poor, aged and
pensioned Americans reveals that the unemployed, pensioned
aged are the poor aged.1 8
D. Impact on Employment
One concern over the new provision, shared by management
and union alike, is that it creates a problem in finding jobs for
new and younger workers. Promotions would be postponed and
young aggressive managers-to-be would avoid companies with a
sedentary upper echelon." 9 It is claimed the new law will dis-
criminate more against those in the physically demanding blue
collar positions while those in white collar jobs demanding more
intellectual exercise would be able to continue working.120 Some
blacks are concerned that the affirmative action efforts of the
1960's would be retarded as fewer opportunities for advancement
would open.12 1
The impact of the new bill on promotion and new openings is
expected to have a five year delaying effect. For the next five
years, it is estimated that 125,000 workers will choose to remain in
their jobs122 while an additional 75,000 may attempt to re-enter
the work force.123
employed will have'to pay higher payments. Seixas, Evidence Mounts That
Mandatory Retirement Costs Too Much, Wastes Talent, and May Be Hazardous to
Your Health, 6 MONEY 43-45 (April 1977). See also, note 70 supra.
118. Bixby, Income of People Aged 65 and Older: Overview From 1968 Survey of
the Aged, 33 Soc. SEC. BULL. 3, 8-10 (April 1970); See also Antonucci, Discrimina-
tion Against the Elderly, 7 SUFF. U.L. REV. 917 (Summer 1973).
119. Colamosca, Grey Rights Retirement Fight, 110 DUN'S REV. 31-32 (Oct. 1977).
120. Id.
121. Hicks, Giving Retirement Five More Years, 8 BLACK ENTERPRISE 33-36
(Dec. 1977).
122. Id.
123. 125,000 additional employees for five years would mean that 625,000 posi-
tions would not open for advancement during that period of time. Economists
speculate that up to 375,000 persons above the age of 65 would attempt to reenter
the labor force. After the expiration of the five year period, the additions to the
work force would stabilize. These figures are based on statistics that reveal that
there are 9.2 million Americans in the work force between the ages of 60 and 64.
Approximately 10 percent of those over age 65 are expected to continue to seek
employment. Currently, 1.6 million of the 8.3 million Americans over the age of 65
are employed. Hicks, Giving Retirement Five More Years, 8 BLACK ENTERPRISE 33-
36 (Dec. 1977); Controversy over Mandatory Retirement Age; Should Congress Pro-
There is a general presumption that older persons are unable to
learn new skills as quickly as their younger counterparts and that
they are more inflexible with regard to work rules, seniority sys-
tems, and pay scales.124 When coupled with the fact that older
people typically have less formal education than younger work-
ers, some employers find the better prospect is found by hiring
the younger worker. To open a position for a younger worker
often requires that an older worker be released.125
The Act could effectively put more money in the hands of the
elderly, but could also stall efforts to reduce unemployment.126
Supporters of mandatory retirement claim that the system pro-
vides a viable way to whittle down the high levels of unemploy-
ment. Proponents of the new legislation have claimed, however,
that the bill will have little effect on unemployment patterns na-
tionwide.127 When an individual retires from the labor force, his
former position is usually filled by someone from a subordinate
position. There follows a chain of promotion until an entry level
position is made available to a young and relatively inexperienced
worker. These entry level openings, as a result of concerted ac-
tion in recent years, have been made available to minorities. One
claim frequently raised against abolition of mandatory retirement
is that such action will jeopardize affirmative action advances by
closing off job openings to young minority workers. 28 However,
the better view is the number of entry level openings made avail-
able to minority workers will only be slightly diminished in favor
of enhanced employment prospects for another minority, the
older worker. In addition, this diminution will have an effect only
for the next five years. 29
Current figures indicate no more than 40,000 workers were in-
voluntarily retired in 1977.130 The effect of the legislation would
hibit the Mandatory Retirement of Workers Over Age 65?, 56 CONG. DIG. 258-88
(Nov. 1977).
124. Mandatory Retirement: The Social and Human Cost of Enforced Idleness,
REPORT BY THE SEN. COMM. ON AGING, 95th Cong., Comm. Pub. No. 95-91 (August
1977).
125. Id.
126. Wysocki & Hyatt, Mandatory Retirement at 65 is Likely to End: Business
and Labor Wary, 190 Wall St. J. (Oct. 13, 1977).
Note, however, that other indicators show that the legislation will probably have
little or no effect on unemployment in light of the present trend toward early re-
tirement.
127. Prakken, Mandatory Retirement: Issues and Impacts, 3 FED. RES. BANK OF
N.Y.Q. REV. 25 (Spring 1978).
128. Id. at 27.
129. See note 121, supra.
130. United States Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare, Social Security Ad-
ministration, Reaching Retirement Age (Washington, D.C. 1976). A 1968 survey of
newly entitled beneficiaries of the Social Security system revealed that nearly 30
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indicate, over a five year period, an estimated 200,000 persons
could be affected.1 31 These figures suggest the overall effect on
unemployment will be minimal in the short run and almost negli-
gible in the longer term. The figure of 200,000 represents only
about 0.2 percent of the work force. Unfortunately, these figures
do not consider the number of workers who were informally pres-
sured into retirement and who subsequently withdrew from the
quest for further employment.
There are other reasons why the suggested impact of the new
legislation can be discounted. If a worker is mandatorily retired
at the same time a new worker is hired into the opening, there is
no net impact on the unemployment rate. If, however, the worker
withdraws from the work force, the rate falls. But if the older
worker remains in the work force, the unemployment rate will not
be affected because the older worker will have made a de facto
exchange of positions in the labor market and the overall age dis-
tribution of employment would increase.
The unemployment rate also fails to include those persons who,
following a compelled retirement, withdraw from the labor force
entirely. The number of these individuals is not reflected in the
unemployment rate. Therefore, the official measure of unemploy-
ment understates the actual number of those willing to work.
Any increase in the official figures would possibly be more reflec-
tive of an innovation in data-gathering methods than a change in
the national unemployment picture. In this sense, a more accu-
rate measurement of unemployment should be welcomed as a
more useful indicator of the nation's well-being.132
Other indicators pose a somewhat different employment out-
percent of the men and 27 percent of the women who retired at age 65 were com-
pulsorily retired despite their wishes to continue working in their former jobs.
When these percentages are applied to the number of workers retiring in 1977,
they suggest that 40,000 workers were involuntarily retired from their work that
year. The figures cited in the Social Security Administration's study are some-
what smaller than those reported in a 1974 survey conducted by Louis Harris and
Associates. The Harris poll found that 37 percent of retired employees were com-
pulsorily retired.
This estimated effect may be multiplied by five (the number of years of antici-
pated effect) to determine the number of total employees affected.
131. Id. Thereafter, workers will be mandatorily retired at age seventy. A
slight increase in the numbers of workers between age 65 and 70 would be found
as the percentage of the population over sixty-five increases. See note 121, supra,
at 33-36.
132. See note 127, supra at 29.
look. A recent study 133 indicated up to one-third of non-manage-
ment employees would work past age sixty-five if the mandatory
retirement age were raised, by law, to seventy. Such a decision
by a large contingent of the labor force would raise real unem-
ployment by one-half of one percent in 1979 and would increase to
one percent by 1982. Once stabilized, the trend could increase un-
employment by nearly 5 percent, if workers chose to continue
working.
In summary, the probable long-term effects of the new law's im-
pact on unemployment may increase slightly as the percentage of
the population over sixty-five rises. The immediate effects will be
minimal. Barring any significant or dramatic change in the em-
ployment patterns of the elderly, the bill will have only a nominal
economic effect on the unemployed labor force.
III. THE INTERESTS IN FAVOR OF THE BILL
A. The Consideration Given Mandatory Retirement by the
Courts
Broadly stated, there are a multiplicity of social concerns that
decry the impositions of mandatory retirement. The courts have
been repeatedly called upon for recourse in this matter, but they
have generally been unwilling to grant relief.'3 4
The keystone case, Massachusetts v. Murgia,135 upheld a law re-
quiring a state policeman to retire at age fifty. The Court held
there was no denial of procedural due process, 136 equal protec-
tion, 137 or a violation of any other pertinent statutes. 138
In Murgia, instituted prior to the enactment of the ADEA, the
plaintiff claimed the statute compelling retirement violated his
fourteenth amendment right of equal protection. The Supreme
133. Big Fight Over Retirement at Age 65, 83 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. 30-32
(Oct. 3, 1977), citing a report by Sears, Roebuck and Company.
134. Massachusetts v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976); Weisbrod v. Lynn, 420 U.S.
940 (1975), affg 383 F. Supp. 933 (D.D.C. 1974); Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting, 500
F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1974); McIlvaine v. Pennsylvania, 454 Pa. 129, 309 A.2d 801, dis-
missed for want of substantial federal question, 415 U.S. 986 (1974).
135. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
136. Id. at 309, citing Weisbrod v. Lynn, 420 U.S. 940 (1975), affd 383 F. Supp.
933 (D.D.C. 1974). The Supreme Court in Weisbrod affirmed a three judge district
court decision requiring a man to retire at age 70 with 15 years of service.
137. Id.
138. Id., citing Bradley v. Kissinger, 418 F. Supp. 64 (D.D.C. 1976). See also Be-
har, Restrictive Age Covenants, 52 L.A. BAR J. 30 (1976) stating that "When judicial
aid is sought to enforce restrictions which are clearly discriminatory, the courts
will refuse to permit such discrimination practices if it is determined that (a)
there is no compelling need or interest on the part of the state to enforce discrimi-
natory practices, and (b) the rights involved are deemed fundamental" in refer-
ence to age based exclusions from housing. Id. at 31.
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Court reversed the appellate court's holding. They held that the
state had a legitimate interest in the fitness of the state police
force, but that it had failed to establish a rational basis 139 for the
imposition of mandatory retirement by finding that age was not a
suspect classification. 140 Additionally, the Court failed to find the
139. 477 U.S. 307, 310 (1976). The Supreme Court has established two principal
approaches for use in determining the constitutionality of state statutes on Equal
Protection grounds. Under the traditional rational basis test, United States v.
Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152, n.4 (1937), the court held unconstitutional
only those statutes containing provisions which lack any reasonable relation to a
legitimate government objective.
In Murgia, the Supreme Court reinforced its exclusive reliance on the two tier
system for resolution of equal protection questions. The three judge district court
concluded that the statute requiring mandatory retirement at age 50 was not rea-
sonably related to any state interest and was therefore an unconstitutional viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause. Murgia v. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement,
376 F. Supp. 753 (D. Mass. 1974), rev'd, 427 U.S. 307 (1976). See also U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 1. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and held that the rationality
test is the standard used to determine the constitutionality of a statute that
neither disadvantages any suspect class nor infringes on any fundamental inter-
ests. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
Originally, the Supreme Court held that the 14th amendment permitted statu-
tory classification systems that were rationally related to the legislative purpose of
the statute and treated everyone within the classification equally. United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,
348 U.S. 483 (1955). Courts would employ a more stringent test only when a stat-
ute used race as a classification factor. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
The Warren Court developed the two tier analysis of challenged statutes, in
which the strictness of review depended on the classification created and the indi-
vidual interest affected. Compare McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs., 394
U.S. 802 (1969); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); with Weber v. Aetna
Cas. Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Sha-
piro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). The Court continues to apply the traditional
rational basis test to most statutory classifications, McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 426 (1961). The test works under the presumptive validity of the statute and
will assume that any, perhaps unarticulated, legislative purpose will be rational.
Nearly every challenge has been deficient in proving that the statute is entirely
invalid or irrational. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961); Village of
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1971);
McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs., 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
Modernly, the rational basis test has been more vigorously applied in those
cases involving suspect classifications which are close to being held "suspect" or
involving interests which, although not judicially as "fundamental," are recognized
as very important. See Gunther, Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 11-48
(1972); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAiv. L. REv. 1065, 1076-
1132 (1969).
140. When a judicially defined "suspect class" serves as the basis of a statutory
classification, or where statutory provisions infringe upon a "fundamental inter-
est," the Court has invoked a more critical level of review. In such cases, the pre-
sumption of constitutionality is inverted, and a compelling state interest must be
right to continued government employment as a fundamental in-
terest.141 Applying the rational basis standard,142 the Court found
that age did have some debilitating characteristics and that
mandatory retirement was rationally related to the state's interest
in maintaining a vigorous police force.143
Dissenting, Justice Marshall argued the Court had applied a too
lenient standard of review. 44 While agreeing with the majority's
conclusion that the strict scrutiny used in the compelling state in-
terest test was inapplicable based upon past precedent, Justice
Marshall felt that certain classifications, while not "suspect," are
deserving of a greater level of protection than afforded by the
traditional "rational basis" standard. This intermediate level of
review, Justice Marshall opined, was warranted in this context in
light of the "repeated and arbitrary discrimination in employ-
ment" to which the class of older workers is subject and the im-
portance of the liberty interest involved.14 5 Marshall did,
demonstrated to justify the challenged state action. This classification was given a
higher level of protection, known as strict scrutiny, because those classifications
were unduly burdened by statute with an impermissible purpose denying a spe-
cific right. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634-35 (1969). See also Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1934). Absent a compelling state interest, the Court will
find the statute unconstitutional. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rod-
riquez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Rarely
did a statute survive this higher level of review. As a result, the level of review,
rational basis or strict scrutiny, often became determinative of the outcome of an
equal protection case.
141. See note 140, supra.
142. Weisbrod v. Lynn, 420 U.S. 940 (1975), a fg 383 F. Supp. 933; McIlvaine v.
Pennsylvania, 454 Pa. 129, 309 A.2d 801, dismissed for want of substantial federal
question, 415 U.S. 986 (1974). See also note 139, supra.
143. See 427 U.S. at 315-16 and nn.7 & 10.
144. Id. at 319.
145. Id. at 319, 320. In the late 1960's the Court began to seek a mid-level of re-
view that would overcome the rigidity of the two tier approach. Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). It expanded the definitions of fundamental interest and
suspect class. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), and began
to utilize a sliding scale of review. In 1973, in San Antonio v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1,
109, 124-25, the Court indicated that it would no longer use this intermediate level
of review. Continuing to search for a mid-level review, the Court variously em-
ployed the irrebuttable presumption doctrine, Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330
(1971); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)
and the enhanced rational basis test, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Maher v.
Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1978); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
The latter, while not widely followed, requires a fair and substantial relationship
between the means chosen to effectuate the legislative purpose and the objective
itself. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). The advantages to the challenger
who invokes this level of review are twofold:
1. The Court will restrict itself to the object of the legislation, curbing
the ability to speculate to an acceptable reason for the classification. Mc-
Gowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); and
2. The Court will not recognize administrative inconvenience as a legit-
imate objective of the statute. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
In essence, the courts are required to more sharply focus on the legitimacy of the
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however, note that the holding was not dispositive to all
mandatory retirement statutes and that successive applications of
the rational basis test would determine the varying ages to be sin-
gled out for forced retirement.
Comparing age discrimination with racial discrimination,146 the
Court found three significant differences. First, older persons had
not been subjected to a history of purposeful, unequal treat-
ment. 47 Second, the Court found older individuals had been dis-
criminated against and forced to retire on criteria based on
ability. In contrast, race-related discrimination was frequently
articulated legislative intent. The Court should use the enhanced rational basis
test on sex-based classifications and close-to fundamental rights. LeVein, The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, Statutory Requirements and Recent Develop-
ments, 13 DuQ. L. REV. 227, 230 (1974).
The Court, in Murgia, specifically signalled an end to the irrebuttable presump-
tion doctrine. Turner v. Dept. of Employment Security, 423 U.S. 44 (1975) (per
curiam); Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); See gener-
ally, Bezanson, Some Thoughts on the Emerging Irrebuttable Presumption Doc-
trine, 7 IND. L. REV. 644 (1974); Comment, Constitutional Law: Court Substitutes
Conclusive Presumption Approach for Equal Protection Analysis, 58 MINN. L. REV.
965 (1974); Note, Irrebuttable Presumption: An Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV.
449 (1975); Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1534 (1974); Note, The Conclusive Presumption Doctrine; Equal Proc-
ess or Due Protection?, 72 MICH. L. REV.800 (1974); The Supreme Court, 1974 Term:
Irrebuttable Presumptions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 49, 77 (1975).
The Court has also indicated that it will not, given a clear opportunity, expand
the categories of fundamental interest or suspect classification. Barrett, Judicial
Supervision of Legislative Classifications-A More Modest Role for Equal Protec-
tion?, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 89, Gunther, Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on
a Changing Court, A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1972).
146. The Supreme Court's recognition of the difference between constitutional
race and age discrimination definitions need not necessarily color the statutory in-
terpretations of the same issues. The ambiguity inherent in definition of the
Equal Protection Clause will often force the courts to evaluate those claims de-
serving societal protection and, where warranted, afford special constitutional rec-
ognition and protection to certain interests. Developments in the Law-Equal
Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1103-04, 1162-1163 (1969); The Origin and Scope of
the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893). It may
be inferred that Congress had taken the initial step of identifying these interests
deserving a special standard of scrutiny by passing remedial legislation to specifi-
cally protect their interests. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S.
106, 109-110 (1949); Construction Industry Association v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d
897, 908-09 (9th Cir. 1975).
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), explicitly held that the standard of
proof to be applied in employment discrimination cases under the 14th amend-
ment is different than that applicable to Title VII actions. It may be inferred that
the ADEA is also not entitled to scrutiny similar to that afforded constitutional ac-
tions.
147. 427 U.S. 307, supra n.135 at 314-315.
based on factors other than job-related characteristics. 148 This
suggested that age is more of a job-related characteristic than
race. Finally, the Court did not find that older people comprised a
"discrete and insular" minority deserving of "extraordinary pro-
tection from the majoritarian political process" since the effects of
aging encompass all of society.149
The immediate effect of Murgia was to dispel the hopes of
those who thought the Supreme Court would strike down a
mandatory retirement statute considered on its merits. 5 0 Other
courts have indicated their willingness to find a mandatory retire-
ment statute unconstitutional, however, they have been con-
strained by the restraints imposed by Murgia and other cases.151
The Court, in the application of the ADEA, has been able to use
a more protective standard than in the constitutional cases. The
articulated intent of the ADEA was to promote employment of
older persons "based on their ability rather than age."'1 2 The
ADEA finds age discrimination permissible only if age is a "bona
fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the opera-
tion of the particular business." 5 3 In the "protection" of
age/employment concerns, the courts have attempted to use the
broadest interpretation possible.
Initially, the similarities between the ADEA and Title VII154 led
the courts to refer to the interpretations of the Civil Rights Act in
defining similar ADEA provisions. 55 As the judicial interpreta-
148. Id. at 315.
149. Id.
150. Note, 4 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 369, 373 (1977).
151. Gault v. Garrison, 523 F.2d 205, 209 (1975), dismissing appeal from 454 Pa.
129, 309 A.2d 801 (1973), citing Mcllvaine v. Pennsylvania, 415 U.S. 986.
"Our conclusion must be that if we were to decide this appeal today, we would
be constrained to honor the aforementioned Supreme Court summary judgment
dispositions as being pursuasive precedents, if not binding .... " See also Weis-
brod v. Lynn, 420 U.S. 940 (1975), affg 383 F. Supp. 933 (D.D.C. 1974); Pilots Assn. v.
Quesda, 276 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 962 (1961). For an excel-
lent discussion of a mandatory retirement statute, see Note, Constitutional Attacks
on Mandatory Retirement: A Reconsideration, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 549 (1975).
152. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621(f)(1) & 621(b) (1970).
153. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1970). The bona fide occupational qualification
(BFOQ) must be construed very narrowly in a similar manner to the interpreta-
tion given the similar Title VII provision. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1) (1970); 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a) (1970); see also Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1225
(9th Cir. 1971); Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 408 F.2d 228,
235 (5th Cir. 1969).
154. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-et seq. (1964).
155. Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1265, 1259 (10th Cir. 1976), aff'd per curiam,
434 U.S. 99 (1977), rehearing denied, 434 U.S. 1042 (1978); Moses v. Falstaff Brewing
Corp., 525 F.2d 92, 94 (8th Cir. 1975); Curry v. Continental Air Lines, 513 F.2d 691,
693 (9th Cir. 1975). But see, Fellows v. Medford Corp., 431 F. Supp. 199, 201 (D.C.
Ore. 1977); see also Moses v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 550 F.2d 1113, 1114 (8th Cir.
1977); Marshall v. Hills Bros., 432 F. Supp. 1320, 1235 (N.D. Calif. 1977).
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tion of the ADEA has developed, a difference in the manner and
tenacity with which the acts are enforced becomes readily appar-
ent. The Civil Rights Act has been construed to provide the maxi-
mum protection for the groups encompassed by the statute.156 At
the same time, a dichotomy has evolved in the enforcement of the
ADEA. Some courts have reached results consistent with Title
VII decisions. 5 7 Other courts, failing to provide a constant level
of protection, have held the existence of a separate statute im-
plied a different degree of protection was to be afforded.158
One area where there is a difference in the methods of enforce-
ment in Title VII and the ADEA is in the allocation of the burden
of proof. In most civil cases, the plaintiff is responsible for
presenting a quantum of evidence to sustain a favorable judg-
ment. That quantum is said to preponderate over the evidence
produced by the defendant. 5 9 Title VII cases, however, recognize
a presumption in the plaintiff's favor, easing the burden of proof
placed on the plaintiff.160 The plaintiff need only show a prima fa-
cie case of employment discrimination, e.g., that a qualified appli-
cant was rejected and that an employer continued to seek
applications from individuals with the rejected applicant's qualifi-
cations.16 1 Some courts maintain the view that the burden of
proof has shifted entirely to the defendant. 162
The allocation of the burden of proof has been undertaken in a
somewhat different manner in cases involving the ADEA than in
Title VII cases. Some circuits dealing with cases initially brought
under the ADEA held that the standard for the burden of proof
should be examined in the application of the ADEA, and the bur-
den should entirely shift to rest upon the defendant to justify any
156. Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971); Hill, The
New Judicial Perception of Employment Discrimination-Litigation Under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 43 U. COLO. L. REV. 243, 253-54 & n.39 (1972);
Note, Employment Discrimination: A Title VII Symposium, 34 LA. L. REV. 540
(1974).
157. Hodgson v. First Federal Say. & Loan Assn, 455 F.2d 818, 822 (5th Cir. 1972);
Aaron v. Davis, 414 F. Supp. 453 (E.D. Ark. 1976).
158. Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 312 (6th Cir. 1975); Hodgson v.
Greyhound Lines,. Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122
(1975). See also note 146, supra.
159. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 337, 338 (2d ed.
1972).
160. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800-03 (1973); Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
161. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
162. James, Burdens of Proof, 47 VA. L. REV. 51, 58-60, 62-63 (1961).
age disparity.163 Other circuits refused to recognize the shifting
burden of proof upon the presentation of prima facie evidence
showing employment discrimination.164
A policy consideration must also be regarded at this point. Sim-
ilar to Title VII, it is likely that the presumption of discrimination
in favor of those allegedly discriminated against under the ADEA
would demand that an employer govern his actions watching for
possible discrimination each time he is faced with a hiring or
firing decision. As a practical matter, these considerations would
probably dictate preferences toward older workers whenever
there was some doubt.165 Social policy would demand the ex-
traordinary measures utilized under Title VII not be widely ap-
plied, so as to avoid the loss of the desired impact of those laws.
Currently, a priority or greater justification is generally recog-
nized in favor of women and racial minorities. 66 Again, the Sec-
retary of Labor found there was little hostility directed at older
workers as a group, unlike the hostility directed toward other dis-
163. Hodgson v. First Federal Savings, 455 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1972).
164. Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975).
In reviewing the precedent set by McDonnell Douglas, the Court in Laugesen
refused to apply the Title VII precedent to the ADEA in light of their existence as
separate acts with distinct legislative histories. The Court noted three factors dis-
tinguishing the two acts. First, an ADEA case might be tried to a jury unlike a
Title VII action. The Court didn't reach a decision as to whether the ADEA affords
a right to a jury. Id. at 312, n.2. See also 113 Cong. Rec. 31255 (1967) (remarks of
Sen. Javits, assuming the right to jury trials would be afforded under the ADEA).
But see, Brennan v. International Harvester, Inc., 7 Empl. Prac. Dec. 9171, at 6904
(N.D. Ill. 1973) which held that there was no jury right since the requested reme-
dies were essentially equitable. It was assumed that jury prejudice against a de-
fendant in Title VII action was likely, warranting the exclusion of the right to a
jury trial. Comment, The Right to Jury Trial under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 37 U. CHi. L. REV. 167, 167-168 (1969).
Second, the Court distinguished Laugesen from McDonnell Douglas, a Title VII
case involving racial discrimination in a refusal to hire, where the suit involved
age discrimination in the discharge of an employee. 510 F.2d at 312 & n.3.
Finally, the Court held that the allocation of the burden of proof in McDonnell
Douglas simply did not apply to ADEA cases. Id.
These justifications are not overtly pursuasive. The Court failed to discuss the
significance and reasoning behind the distinction disallowing juries in Title VII
cases. 510 F.2d at 312, n.2. The Court also failed to distinguish between race and
age classifications. Id. at 312, n.4; McDonnell Douglas at 802-03. Finally, the Court
was unclear as to why there should be a distinction between the failure to hire
and discharge. See generally, 411 U.S. 792, 802, n.13 (1973).
165. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHi. L. REV. 235, 256 (1971).
166. Developments in the Law--Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1109, 1116-1117 (1971). Employers' deci-
sions with regard to women and blacks will generally be suspected as being af-
fected by stereotypes unrelated to ability. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944). There is a greater reason to suspect that women and racial groups
were disadvantaged on the basis of sex and race than it is to assume that older
people were discriminated against because of their age.
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criminated-against groups.167
The bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ)168 and the re-
tirement provisions' 69 of the ADEA are the most frequently liti-
gated exceptions to the Act. Because the Act is liberally
interpreted so as to more effectively realize its remedial purpose,
both exceptions must be narrowly construed.l7 0
United Airlines v. McMann171 held a retirement plan could not
be used as a subterfuge to avoid the purposes of the Act. 172 How-
ever, the Court recognized that retirement plans existing prior to
the institution of the Act would continue to be recognized as valid
and a more stringent construction of the Act would apply only to
those plans instituted after its inception. 7 3
167. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT UNDER SECTION 715 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1965).
168. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1979). It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employ-
ment agency or labor organization-
(1) to take any action otherwise prohibited under subsections (a), (b),
(c), or (e) of this section where age is a bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular busi-
ness, or where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other
than age;
(2) to observe the term of a bona fide seniority system or any bona fide
employee benefit plan such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan,
which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of this Chapter, except
that no such employee benefit plan shall excuse the failure to hire any in-
dividual, and no such seniority system or employee benefit plan shall re-
quire or permit the involuntary retirement of any individual specified by
section 631(a) of this title because of the age of such individual;
(3) to discharge or otherwise discipline an individual for good cause.
See also note 187, infra.
169. There are 3 primary exceptions to the Act. The first exemption is found
where retirement is mandated by a lawful benefit pension or retirement plan. The
second exemption is allowed where retirement is required because of factors
other than age. Finally, the BFOQ exception allows forced retirement where the
job demands that certain age related qualifications be met.
170. Moses v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 525 F.2d 92, 93 (8th Cir. 1975).
171. United Airlines v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977).
172. Id. In McMann v. United Airlines, Inc., 542 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1976), it was
asserted that a retirement plan could not be viewed as a subterfuge to the ADEA
if it had been established in 1944 and that the employee voluntarily joined the
plan. The Circuit Court relied on Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 500 F.2d 212
(5th Cir. 1974) to conclude that what was forbidden by the Act is not a subterfuge
to evade the Act, but a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the Act. Thus, al-
though the mandatory retirement provision predated the Act, it could still be con-
strued as a discriminatory practice that the Act was designed to eliminate. The
Court concluded by asserting that avoidance of condemnation as a "subterfuge"
could only be found where the retirement provision was founded on a bona fide
economic or business purpose. 542 F.2d at 221-22.
173. The Court attempted to resolve the apparent difference between the con-
tradicting opinions found in the 4th Circuit McMann case and Zinger v. Blan-
The BFOQ exemption must be narrowly construed in a manner
similar to that accorded to § 707(e) of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.174 In the absence of a high court determination, two circuit
courts have created the tests to be used in determining the crite-
ria for a bona fide occupational qualification sufficient to justify
discriminatory practices.175 In each case, the courts were dealing
with issues where sex had been asserted as a bona fide occupa-
tional requirement17 6 The courts have been reluctant to broadly
extend their rationale recognizing sex as a BFOQ to cases under
the ADEA involving age as a BFOQ.177 Cases relying on the as-
sertion of a BFOQ defense under an ADEA action have sought
evidence of a factual basis or a reasonable necessity for the asser-
tion of this defense by the employer. 78 The two leading cases
under the ADEA have rejected the factual basis test and, instead,
have required a BFOQ defense meet either the less stringent ra-
tional basis test 79 or, in the alternative, that a factual basis test
chette, 549 F.2d 901, cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 717 (1974), a holding in the 6th Circuit.
In Zinger, the Court preferred to apply a relaxed standard to find that a pre-Act
standard was bona fide. In seeking a resolution to this conflict, the Supreme Court
had to address the question of whether the intent of section 4(f)(2) was to en-
courage the hiring of older persons without being obligated to pay full retirement
benefits or whether it was intended to provide for lawful mandatory retirement
under benefit or pension plans.
The majority held that the clause was designed to perpetuate existing benefit
plans which compelled retirement. Marshall's dissent points out the anomaly of
the fact that an employee forced to retire could reapply for the job and as the most
qualified applicant, regain his job under the ADEA. Legislative intent seems to be
in accord with the dissent. Congress specifically disapproved of the findings in the
Taft and Zinger cases and approved of the 4th Circuit's McMann decision. S. REP.
No. 95-493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
174. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1) (1970) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970). See
Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 1971); Weeks v.
Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969).
175. See Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971)
and Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir.
1969).
176. Id. In Weeks, the Fifth Circuit Court found a standard requiring the em-
ployer to prove a factual basis for the assertion that all or substantially all mem-
bers of a protected class under Title VII were unable to perform at the specific
type of job. 408 F.2d at 235. The Diaz Court expanded this reasoning to find that
evidence of a reasonable necessity for the discriminatory practice must be shown.
442 F.2d at 387-88.
177. 408 F.2d at 236.
178. Id. See also Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 553 F.2d 561, 564 (8th
Cir.) cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977); Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d
224, 235-36 (5th Cir. 1976); Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975). Hodgson and Usery are the two leading
cases discussing a BFOQ defense in refusals to hire. Both cases involve bus lines
that established maximum ages for the initial employment of bus drivers. Maxi-
mum ages were 35 for Greyhound (Hodgson) and 40 for Tamiami (Usery).
179. 499 F.2d at 865. In Hodgson, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals overturned
the decision of the lower court applying the "factual basis" test by using the less
demanding rational basis test.
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be met if applicants could not be individually screened.180 This
second test is probably the more rigorous of the two, requiring
close judicial scrutiny.181 To date, no clear test has evolved upon
which the assertion of a BFOQ defense may be adequately re-
viewed.182
The third exception to the ADEA is found in what the statute
refers to as "reasonable factors other than age." 8 3 The judicial
interpretation of this phrase has been limited to factors described
as bona fide economic judgments or as valid economic necessities
which justify discriminatory activity. 8 4 A narrow interpretation
of this clause is consistent with the expressed intent of the Act to
promote employment on ability rather than on age.185
Within the third exception to the ADEA, many factors may
have importance in an assertion of this claim as a defense.186 The
Secretary of Labor determined reasonable factors that may be al-
lowed to influence an employer's decision and mandated the
plaintiff demonstrate that age was a determinative factor in the
180. In the Usery case, the 5th Circuit rejected the rational basis test and found
there was insufficient data to meet the factual basis test. 531 F.2d at 236. The
Court then proceeded to bifurcate the Weeks holding into alternative standards.
The Court required the defendant to show either a factual basis for believing that
all or substantially all of the job applicants would be incapable of driving buses
safely, 531 F.2d at 237, or that individualized examination would ineffectively
screen out the nonqualified applicants. Id.
181. See generally Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 90
HARV. L. REV. 380, 406-07 (1976).
182. In Aaron v. Davis, 414 F. Supp. 453 (E.D. Ark. 1976), the court refused to
apply the rational basis test. The court found the presumed disqualification of
firemen older than 62 not rationally founded. The court found the employer's legit-
imate concern should be met by the institution of periodic examinations.
Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 553 F.2d 561 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 966 (1977), required a firm factual basis must be outlined to justify the asser-
tion of a BFOQ. 553 F.2d at 564 Cf., Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone and Tele-
graph Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969).
183. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1) (1970). See note 168, supra.
184. Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 316 (6th Cir. 1975); Bishop v. Jelleff
Associates, 398 F. Supp. 579, 593 (D.D.C. 1974); Gill v. Union Carbide Corp., 368 F.
Supp. 364, 366 (E.D. Tenn. 1973).
185. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1970).
The early interpretations of this clause seem to have taken a narrower interpre-
tation of the exception than did later interpretations. Compare, Bishop v. Jelleff
Associates, 398 F. Supp. 579, 593 (D.D.C. 1974); Schulz v. Hickok Mfg. Co., 358 F.
Supp. 1208, 1214 (D.C. Ga. 1973) with Moses v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 550 F.2d
1113, 1114 (8th Cir. 1977); Mastie v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1299, 1309
(E.D. Mich. 1976); Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 313 (6th Cir. 1975).
186. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 403 (1976).
discharge.187 This mandate has been interpreted as meaning that
187. Regulation 29 C.F.R. § 860.103 (1976) provides:
Differentiations based on reasonable factors other than age:
(a) Section 4(f)(1) of the Act provides that "[I]t shall not be unlawful
for an employer, employment agency, or labor organization . . . to take
any action otherwise prohibited under paragraphs (a), (b), (c) or (e) of
this section . . . where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors
other than age; .... "
(b) No precise and unequivocal determination can be made as to the
scope of the phrase "differentiation based on reasonable factors other
than age." Whether such differentiations exist must be decided on the ba-
sis of all the particular facts and circumstances surrounding each individ-
ual situation.
(c) It should be kept in mind that it was not the purpose or intent of
Congress in enacting this Act to require the employment of anyone, re-
gardless of age, who is disqualified on grounds other than age from per-
forming a particular job. The clear purpose is to insure that age, within
the limits prescribed by the Act, is not a determining factor in making any
decision regarding hiring, dismissal, promotion or any other term, condi-
tion, or privilege of employment of an individual.
(d) The reasonableness of a differentiation will be determined on an in-
dividual, case by case basis, not on the basis of any general or class con-
cept, with unusual working conditions given weight according to their
individual merit.
(e) Further, in accord with a long chain of decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States with respect to other remedial labor legislation,
all exceptions such as this must be construed narrowly, and the burden of
proof in establishing the applicability of the exception will rest upon the
employer, employment agency or labor union which seeks to invoke it.
(f) Where the particular facts and circumstances in individual situations
warrant such a conclusion, the following factors are among those which
may be recognized as supporting a differentiation based on reasonable
factors other than age.
(1) (i) Physical fitness requirements based upon preemployment or peri-
odic physical examinations relating to minimum standards for employ-
ment: Provided, however, that such standards are reasonably necessary
for the specific work to be performed and are uniformly and equally ap-
plied to all applicants for the particular job category, regardless of age.
(ii) Thus, a differentiation based on a physical examination, but not one
based on age, may be recognized as reasonable in certain job situations
which necessitate stringent physical requirements due to inherent occu-
pational factors such as the safety of the individual employees or of other
persons in their charge, or those occupations which by nature are particu-
larly hazardous: For example, iron workers, bridge builders, sandhogs,
underwater demolition men, and other similar job classifications which re-
quire rapid reflexes or a high degree of speed, coordination, dexterity, en-
durance or strength.
(iii) However, a claim for a differentiation will not be permitted on the
basis of an employer's assumption that every employee over a certain age
in a particular type of job usually becomes physically unable to perform
the duties of that job. There is medical evidence, for example, to support
the contention that such is generally not the case. In many instances, an
individual at age 60 may be physically capable of performing heavy-lifting
on a job, whereas another individual of age 30 may be physically incapable
of doing so.
(2) Evaluation factors such as quantity or quality of production, or edu-
cational level, would be acceptable bases for differentiation when, in the
individual case, such factors are shown to have a valid relationship to job
requirements and where the criteria or personnel policy establishing such
factors are applied uniformly to all employees, regardless of age.
(g) The foregoing are intended only as examples of differentiation based
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age may be legally included in the factors considered in a termi-
nation decision, but that it cannot be the exclusive determining
factor.18 8
In summary, the statutory and constitutional provisions protect-
ing the aged against discrimination in employment, and in partic-
ular, mandatory retirement, have fallen somewhat short of the
intended legislative purpose. The ADEA and Title VII have, how-
ever, provided more protection than does the fourteenth amend-
ment. The new amendment to the ADEA will be subject to the
same interpretations and limitations, within the new parameters,
as the original Act.
B. Economic Advantages to Employers
Chronological age is generally conceded to be a poor indicator
of one's ability to perform. Although an individual's energy and
physical resources generally decline as he reaches an advanced
age, his skills and accumulated experience still represent valua-
ble assets. The passage of the amendments to the ADEA will
compel employers to better evaluate the varying abilities of their
older employees. 8 9
Some employers foresee a decrease in training costs and specu-
late that,190 although the bill will force management to make af-
on reasonable factors other than age, and do not constitute a complete or
exhaustive list of limitation. It should always be kept in mind that even in
situations where experience has shown that most elderly persons do not
have certain qualifications which are essential to those who hold certain
jobs, some may have them even though they have attained the age of 60 or
64, and thus discrimination based on age is forbidden.
(h) It should also be made clear that a general assertion that the average
cost of employing older workers as a group is higher than the average cost
of employing younger workers as a group will not be recognized as a dif-
ferentiation under the terms and provisions of this Act, unless one of the
other statutory exceptions applies. To classify or group employees solely
on the basis of age for the purpose of comparing costs, or for any other
purpose, necessarily rests on the assumption that the age factor alone
may be used to justify a differentiation-an assumption plainly contrary to
the terms of the Act and the purpose of Congress in enacting it. Differen-
tials so based would serve only to perpetuate and promote the very dis-
crimination at which the Act is directed.
188. Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 317 (6th Cir. 1975); Bishop v. Jelleff
Associates, 398 F. Supp. 579, 592 (D.D.C. 1974). The Court in Laugesen stated that
a plaintiff would be able "to recover if one such factor was ... age and if, in fact, it
made a difference in determining whether he was to be retained or discharged."
510 F.2d 307, 317.
189. See O'Meara, Retirement, 14 ACROSS THE BOARD 4, 5 (Jan. 1977).
190. Id.
firmative decisions,19 1 the net effect will be positive. There is no
conclusive evidence confirming productivity is significantly im-
paired once one reaches age sixty-five. Productivity, with regard
to advancing age, has been seen to either increase 192 or to only
slightly diminish,193 in various studies. Proponents of the Act ar-
gue that inasmuch as ability levels and productivity remain high,
there should be no reason to arbitrarily limit employment.
Proponents also argue that, as employees grow older, their com-
mitment to their job and their reliability increases.1 94 Older work-
ers have demonstrably fewer accidents on the job, less
absenteeism, and less difficulty withstanding stress than do
younger persons.195 Except for jobs imposing heavy demands,
older employees perform as competently and productively as
younger employees. In addition, educational psychologists indi-
cate that there is no significant decline in learning ability.1 96
C. Adverse Medical Impact
There is considerable evidence to indicate the most significant
decline in mental 97 and physical ability comes after retirement,
regardless of the age at which the employee chooses to leave the
191. Wood, Mandatory Retirement and Equal Protection, 28 LAB. L. J. 142 (Mar.
1977), quoting Dr. Arthur S. Flemming, HEW Administrator on Aging.
192. Schwab & Heinemann, Effects of Age and Experience on Productivity, IN-
DUSTRIAL GERONTOLOGY 113 (Winter 1977).
193. Bartley, Compulsory Retirement: A Reevaluation, PERSONNEL 62 (Mar-
April 1977). See also, Proper, Study of Physiologic and Psychologic Aging in Pro-
fessional Pilots, 40 AEROSPACE MEDICINE 557 (1969), indicating among professional
pilots there are virtually no change in circulation, stoke volume, blood pressure at
rest, cardiovascular function, work capacity or grip strength in the spectrum of
ages examined.
194. Bartley, Compulsory Retirement: A Reevaluation, PERSONNEL 62, 66 (Mar-
April 1977). A study of 100 male workers' personnel records were examined after
random selection among 2800 employees including both recent retirees and active
workers. The study revealed absences were approximately doubled among the
younger workers. The absences of the older workers were significantly increased
by a small percentage of ailing employees. The older workers comprised 32 per-
cent of the total number of visits to the infirmary and 39 percent of the total inju-
ries occurring on or off the job.
195. Id.; Meier & Kerr, Capabilities of Middle-Aged and Older Workers: A Sur-
vey of the Literature, 3 INDUSTRIAL GERONTOLOGY 147, 151-54 (Summer, 1976). See
also Medical Aspects of Road Safety, 14 LANCET 992 (May 5, 1960), stating that
older persons have fewer accidents than do younger persons.
196. O'Meara, Retirement, ACROSS THE BOARD 4 (Jan. 1977), citing surveys con-
ducted by the U.S. Labor Department, Canadian Labor Department, New York
State Commission on Human Rights and the Gerontological Society.
197. Drevenstedt, Perceptions of Onsets of Young Adulthood, Middle Age and
Old Age, 31 J. OF GERONTOLOGY 53 (1976), determined that the most significant
contributing factor to the mental and attiudinal changes of older people, far from
being biological, is the role playing caused by acceptance of the stereotypes of so-
ciety toward aging. See also A. COMFORT, A GOOD AGE 86-90 (1976).
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work force.a9 8 Current studies by the American Medical Associa-
tion indicate a sudden cessation of productive work and earning
power of an individual caused by compulsory retirement often
leads to physical or emotional deterioration and premature
death.199
D. Economic Impact on Older Individuals
The new provision of the ADEA has the potential to ease some
of the hardships created by mandatory retirement. Those hard-
ships are found with the loss of position and income for the older
individual where the retiree might have been forced to accept a
lower level of Social Security or pension benefits, or with the diffi-
culty imposed on women who enter the labor market at a rela-
tively late point in life, or with the difficulty in meeting continuing
financial obligations. All of these are in addition to the above-dis-
cussed physical hardship or impact.
Many lower paid workers would prefer to continue to work after
age sixty-five in order to maintain a more dignified life-style than
is economically possible on a fixed income during a high inflation
era.200 A significant portion of the low income retirees indicated
they would like to return to work.201 The amendment will afford
these individuals the opportunity to acquire the benefits of con-
tinued employment for a minimum of an additional five year pe-
riod.
The assertion that most workers over age sixty are eligible for
Social Security and no longer need employment is completely
without foundation.202 Nearly 44 percent of the elderly are
classed as poor, and 11 percent as near poor.203 As previously
198. Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976), see ami-
cus brief submitted by the American Medical Association indicating that forced
retirement may also cause a loss of status and may impair self-satisfaction, social
relationships and self-respect.
199. Id.
200. How Retire-at-70 Would Affect Banks, 69 BANKING 16 (Nov. 1977).
201. J. Ossofsky, Executive Director, National Council on Aging in testimony
before the Sen. Subcommittee on Equal Opportunity, 95th Cong. (Sept. 14, 1976),
indicated that 43 percent of those retirees with income below $3,000 desire employ-
ment.
202. See generally Bixby, Income of People Aged 65 and Older: Overview from
1968 Survey of the Aged, 33 Soc. SEC. BuLL. 3 (April 1970). See also Antonucci,
Discrimination Against the Elderly. A Prospectus of the Problem, 7 SuFF. U. L.
REV. 917 (Summer 1973).
203. See note 202, supra.
mentioned, the unemployed pensioned aged, comprise the poor
aged.20 4
The amendment will probably not have an immediate over-
whelming impact on current unemployment trends.205 The sharp
rise in the ratio of retirement to pre-retirement earnings has been
accompanied by an increase in the number of employees exercis-
ing an early retirement option. The continuing availability of a
relatively high income under such retirement plans makes a re-
versal in this trend highly unlikely.20 6 The net economic impact
of the amendment indicates the vast majority of workers are not
directly affected by mandatory retirement. 20 7
E. Economic Cost to Society
The actual cost associated with the passage of the amendment
may possibly be such that the government will, to a degree, be
able to cut costs. Two factors affect society's cost of supporting
the retired portion of the population through Social Security or
pension plans. First, the increasing ratio of pre-retirement earn-
ings to post-retirement benefits indicates that the cost of main-
taining America's retired population is increasing. 20 8 Cost
reduction will occur as careers are lengthened in response to the
ADEA. Second, contributions to Social Security and to pension
plans will be higher because of lengthened employment at a
higher wage scale and payouts will be lower because people who
otherwise would have begun receiving benefits at age sixty-five
will continue working longer.
The new provision will ease the burden mandatory retirement
204. Id. at 8. Social Security and retirement benefits are the primary income of
90 percent of the 22 million Americans aged 65 and over.
A 1973 HEW survey found that 82 percent of the Americans older than 65 had
incomes of less than $5,000. One million of those people were living on less than
$1,500 annually.
205. Prakken, Mandatory Retirement: Issues and Impacts, FED. RES. BANK OF
N. Y. Q. REV. 25 (Spring 1978). A trend toward early retirement has been notice-
ably underway in the United States since 1956. In that year women became eligi-
ble before age 65 to collect early retirement benefits under the Social Security
program. 55 percent of those eligible now actually collect. In 1961, men were
granted the same privilege and 48 percent now exercise that option. The number
of private and other public retirement programs offering an early retirement op-
tion is also on the rise. Id. at 29-30.
206. Id. See also MANDATORY RETIREMENT: THE SOCIAL AND HUMAN COST OF
ENFORCED IDLENESS, REPORT BY THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON AGING. Cong. Pub. No.
95-91 (Aug. 1977). Ford Motor Co. testified that only 2 percent of their employees
waited until mandatory retirement at age 68, with 89 percent retiring at age 65. Ex-
xon indicated that 20 percent waited until mandatory retirement at age 65 to retire,
General Foods, 30 percent and IBM, 15.9 percent.
207. Id.
208. Id.
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has placed on women who enter the labor market late in life be-
cause they had no opportunity to work until their children were
raised. A late entry into the labor market resulted in a dimin-
ished opportunity to build an adequate level of pension bene-
fits.209 There is now a longer period available to increase those
benefits.
Mandatory retirement also causes an economic hardship on
workers who have continuing financial obligations that have, in
the past, been primarily reserved for younger people (e.g., home
or automobile payments). In addition, more older persons are as-
suming responsibility for relatives who are financially unable to
care for themselves. The ADEA amendment will provide an op-
portunity to those people faced with this imposition to gain the
benefit of an additional five years of work.210
In a broad sense, the provision will serve to stem, in part, the
loss of skills and output from the labor market. The older individ-
ual, given the ability to continue working at a productive level,
will be able to make valuable contributions to an employer, based
on the accumulation of knowledge and experience acquired over
the length of his career. 21 '
The demand for certain types of workers is expected to increase
in the mid-term future requiring the skills of workers, now retir-
ing, in the labor force. For example, blue collar workers are retir-
ing in greater numbers than the numbers of those entering the
market.2 12 Employers speculate the labor supply of blue collar
workers will be inadequate unless employers are willing to allow
209. Big Fight Over Retirement at Age 65, 83 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. 30 (Oct.
3, 1977). Pensions are generally determined by the salary level average from the
five years preceding retirement. If the last five years of work are at a higher level
the pension benefits will also be higher. How Retire-at-70 Would Affect the Banks,
69 BANKING 16 (Nov. 1977).
210. Forced Retirement: An Issue Riling Older Americans, 83 U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. 75-76 (July 4, 1977).
211. Bixby, Retirement Patterns in the United States: Research and Policy Inter-
action, 39 Soc. SEC. BuLL. 3 (August 1976). The article goes on to indicate it is
only since 1972 that the proportion of men, aged 65-69, working at some time dur-
ing the year dropped below one-quarter. For that age group, the labor force, which
was nearly three-fifths in 1955, had dropped to one-half in 1960 and to about one-
third in 1975.
212. Drucker, Thinking About Retirement Policy, WALL ST. J. 24 (Sept. 15, 1977).
Of every 100 people in the labor force who reach 65, approximately 80 are blue col-
lar workers with a high school education or less. Of every 100 young people enter-
ing the work force, at least 50 have advanced education and are simply not
available for the "traditional blue collar jobs." Employers have found an addi-
tional problem in finding and providing an incentive to encourage workers to stay.
older workers to stay on the job past age sixty-five.213
The new legislation will also ease what has become an untena-
ble burden on Social Security and employer retirement plans. If
fixed retirement continues at age sixty-five, 50 percent of every
employee's wage and salary would have to be used to support
older people on retirement by the turn of the century.214 The
amendment can serve as one of many factors needed to reverse
the trend toward the bankrupting of Social Security.
IV. CONCLUSION
In summary, the recent amendments to the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967 have spawned a great deal of criticism.
Proponents favor the bill because it enhances the personal dig-
nity of the older employee and offers a tangible economic benefit
to employers. Opponents to the provision argue the benefit is off-
set by the costs and difficulty of administration.
The measure fell short of the goal expressed by the bill's spon-
sors and senior citizen groups. They will continue to press for
open-ended retirement, arguing that the problems faced by older
participants in the work force can be eased by the abolition of
compulsory retirement. Seeking to emulate provisions in some
foreign countries, the proponents of that last proposal will un-
doubtedly request a more flexible retirement program where a ca-
pable employee can designate his own retirement age, except in
the more arduous occupations. 215 Any such program must, of ne-
cessity, be based on individual evaluations of the employee's ca-
pacity and ability to work. A company may be able to develop
more subtle ways of discouraging an employee from continued
employment than a formal evaluation process. 2 16 Whether a more
"subtle" method of whether an evaluation system is employed,
213. Id.
214. Id. It should be noted, however, that the amendment to the ADEA will not
'save' Social Security. At the inception of Social Security, there were between 9
and 10 employees in the work force to every retiree over age 65. In 1977, this figure
had dropped to 3 workers for every retiree and it is expected that it will be 2.5 to 1
in 1980. The impact of this provision would push the ratio back only to 3.75 to 1.
See also, Retirement at 70?, 118 FORBES 27 (Nov. 1, 1976), indicating in the year 2025
there will be 50 retirees to every 100 workers, a 2 to 1 ratio, requiring a 40 percent
escalation in premiums, if the present trend continues. Today's worker, earning
$15,000 in salary, pays $877.50 in Social Security premiums, retirement, disability
and Medicare taxes and will have to pay $2,300 in the year 2025. This represents 31
percent of his income compared to today's 13 percent. In 1950, this figure was at
1.1 percent and in 1960 at 5.9 percent.
215. Tracy, Flexible Retirement Features Aboard, 41 Soc. SEC. BULL. 18 (May
1978).
216. Forced Retirement: An Issue that is Riling Older Americans, 83 U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP. 75 (July 4, 1977).
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there is a great likelihood employers will be subjected to added
litigation regarding the enforcement of their selected retirement
policy.
The problem hypothesized by Swift in 1726 has become a reality
in the United States. The country has only begun to deal with the
extent of the problem. 2 17 Swift, looking at the immortal Struld-
brugs expected the "immortals would in time become proprietors
of the whole nation, and engross the civil power .... ." Instead,
he found:
"the system of living ... was unreasonable and unjust; because it sup-
posed the perpetuity of youth, health, and vigour, which no man could be
so foolish as to hope, however extravagant he be in his wishes. That the
question therefore was not, whether a man would choose to be always in
the prime of youth, attended with prosperity and health, but how he
would pass the perpetual life under all the disadvantages which old age
brings along with it."
At this point, modern society parts with Swift's analysis. Mod-
ernly, the "proprietors" of the nation have been aided by the
ADEA in their quest to continue in active, fulfilling roles without
the hindrance of failing health and vigour.218
ScoTT W. HANSEN
217. See note 1, supra.
218. Id.

